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The Balanced Budget Amendment: 
How It May Impact Farm Programs 
(William H. Meyers 515 294-1184) 
Most fanners support the concept of a balanced federal 
b1.1dget However, the Balanced Budget Amendment 
(BBA) already passed by the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and recently rejected by the Senate, could have 
far more impact on farmers than the Farm Bill itself. If 
the Senate reconsiders and approves the BBA later this 
year, the Congress ostensibly will be looking for up to 
$700 billion in budget cuts over the next five years. 
This magnitude of reduction would be required to pay 
for proposed tax cuts of $200 billion while putting the 
budget on track to be in balance by 2002. Fanners and 
other agribusiness interests need to watch both tax 
cms and budget cuts to discern the net impact on their 
bottom line. 
Thls is not the ftrst time that farm program decisions 
have been driven by budget pressures. In fact , the last 
two significant changes in conunodity program 
provisions were not enacted in farm legislation but 
were made to cut expenditures as part of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90) and the 
OBRA-93. For example, in 1990 the flex acres provi-
sion was introduced to cut the payment base by 15 
percent and the calculation of deficiency payments for 
wheat and feed grains was changed to use the annual 
average rather than the first seven-month average 
price. 
ln 1995, however, the intensified focus on the budget 
deficit, and the balanced budget amendment (BBA) in 
particular, are certain to increase the pressure to cut 
discretionary and entitlement programs, including 
those directly affecting farmers. President Clinton's 
February 6 budget message focused on preventing 
increases in the deficit rather than on reductions. It 
proposed only $144 billion in spending cuts over five 
years. included no significant changes in farm pro-
grams (though projected costs declined slightly), and 
increased domestic food assistance spending. Cuts 
proposed by the House and Senate are likely to be 
much larger, especially if the BBA is also passed by the 
Senate. 
To get a sense for the size of the projected cuts, 
compare the $700 billion total that could be proposed 
by the House in 1995 to spending cuts of $192.2 
billion in the OBRA-93. This legislation cut agricul-
tural spending by $2.5 billion and increased domestic 
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food programs by $2.5 billion over five years. The 
reported House goal in the first budget-cuning install-
ment of $200 billion is to cut $10 billion ($2 billion 
per year) out of farm and food programs combined. 
But it's not yet known how the cuts would be split or 
what the contribution of these programs would be to 
the second budget-cutting installment of up to $500 
billion. By comparison , fann and conservation 
programs are projected by the Congressional Budget 
Office to cost about $57 bUlion and food programs 
about $196 billion over the next five years. 
Another consideration that may affect the debate is the 
high variability of farm program costs. Current 
programs are designed so that payments and storage 
program costs are higher when prices fall and vice 
versa. lf the budget cutting Includes efforts to make 
farm program costs more predictable, or even com-
p letely predetermined by a fixed budget allocation, 
Congress may consider several alternatives available to 
achieve such a goal. Whether or not any of these 
options would be politically viable remains to be seen, 
but a few are listed here as examples and \vithout 
offering judgment on their efficacy. 
First, the continuation of current loan and farmer-
owned reserve prog1·ams could provide price ·risk 
reduction at minimal cost. This basic set of loan_ and 
stock programs would not incur significant costs. 
These programs cost only $4.15 billion over the last 
five years compared with $58.4 billion for all fann 
programs. While there may be some groups that also 
would want to change the loan and sLOck programs, 
anything more than tinkering at the edges would 
jeopardize the benefits of carrying on a familiar and 
well-understood program as a low-cost price risk 
reduction mechanism. If the loan rates were raised too 
much, it could increase the potential for higher and 
more variable costs and may interfere with market 
prices and export competitiveness. lf the loan rates 
were lowered or changed from nonrecourse ro recourse 
loans, it could decrease the price risk reduction 
provided to producers. 
There are a number of alternative fonns of income 
support or income stabilization that have been sug-
gested and could be layered .on top of these basic loan 
and storage programs. Their design and magnitude 
would be heavily illfluenced by the budget monies 
available to fund them. A common element of these 
programs is the complete elimination of the target 
price, deficiency payment, and set-aside programs. 
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This would present a trade-off of cost and benefits to 
producers. On one band, they would lose the income 
protection that deficiency payments provide, but they 
would gain complete nexibility in allocation decisions 
regarding the use of their land and other inputs. Ihe 
government risk sharing in this case would come in 
the form of a payments scheme such as one of those 
described below and continuing current loan and 
farmer-owned reserve programs in roughly the same 
form in which they currently exist. Here is a sample, 
though not e-xhaustive, list or such alternatives: 
1. Compensation payment guarantee. Perhaps the most 
simple and easily implemented program would consist 
of fixed payments allocated to producers proportional 
to their current payments eligibility. The proportions 
could be based on a formula such as the average of the 
last five years of payments. The advantage of this 
approach in terms of budget is that there would be no 
uncenainty about budget outlays [rom one year to the 
next. These payments would be based on historical 
production and benefit patterns and would not in an y 
way be inOuenced by what would be planted in the 
future. Since these payments would be proportional to 
some recent his torical period, this compensation plan 
would not significantly change the distribution of 
benefits. 
2. Revenue assurance. The Iowa Plan, proposed by a 
task force of Iowa crop and livestock producers and 
farm organizations, combines the continuation o[ 
current loan and s tock programs with an expanded 
insurance program that would be designed to provide a 
revenue safety net in lieu of the yield coverage avail-
able under the current crop insurance program. The 
protection level of the safety features again depends 
upon the budget available for the program. As an 
example, a 70 percent revenue protection plan would 
trigger payments .if revenue in one year fell below 70 
percent of the moving average over the last five years. 
lf revenue assurance were designed in such a way that 
it would be actuarially sound, the government could 
make a fLXed contribution toward the cost of the 
insurance and thereby also maintain cenainty about 
government outlays. ln tllis case, there would be 
variabili ty in the insurance payments from year to year, 
but the government contribution would be fixed. 
3. Targeted payments. A targeted payment scheme 
could be based on a number of different criteria. 
Some have suggested targeted payments based on 
means testing, which would presumably provide little 
or no supporl for large commercial farms, and support 
for middle-sized and smaller farms would hinge on 
some means-based criteria. Although arguments can 
certainly be mounted in support of various targeting 
schemes,.it is unlikely that a debate over targeting a 
shrinking revenue pic could be easily resolved. While 
some members of Congress may support the idea of 
means testing, others may view any kind of targeting 
as a type of social engineering. 
4. Green payments. Using this approach, programs 
related to conservation and environmental concerns 
could be treated independently. Under option one 
above, where payments are constant and continuous, 
there could be some kind of conservation comp1iance 
conditionality. The other schemes do not lend them-
selves well to this hind of linkage, especially the 
targeted program, which may not include a large pan 
of the U.S. land in production. The wetlands reserve 
program is a freestanding example. A targeted and 
reformed CRP program could be designed in a similar 
manner, where payments are made in return for 
meeting specific land use requirements. However, a 
linkage between conunodity and "green'' programs 
may occur on the budget side. That is, if more funds 
were used for environmental programs such as a 
targeted CRP, less would be available for the income 
support or stabilization programs. 
In this environment, Iowa farmers and their organiza-
tions should be comparing the potemial benefits of 
deficit reductions and tax cuts to the potential losses in 
farm program benefits. With regard to farm program 
reform, it seems likely that reduced monetary benefits 
· would be offset by increased decision making flexibil-
ity in land use. Depending on the size of the required 
spencling cut, changes could involve a wide range of 
options such as increasing nex acres from 15 percent 
to some higher level, reducing target prices, eliminat-
ing the export enhancement program, or replacing 
current programs with some combination of safety net 
provisions as discussed . There is no doubt that deficit 
reduction is a higher priority this year than it bas been 
before, and that this priori ty will be of increased 
importance if the Balanced Budget Amendment passes 
the Senate as well as the House. 
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